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Broadcasters' Rights: Whether to Air
Independent Political Action
Committee Advertisments
By WILLIAM C. OLDAKER* and
DONALD S. PICARD**
Introduction
With obsolete Titan I missile silos in the background, Representa-
tive James Golder tells the television viewer that:
I'm standing in front of these missile silos to dramatize one of the
effects of Senator Church's power in Washington. These silos
aren't filled with missiles anymore. They are empty. Because of
that, they won't be of much help in defense of your family or
mine. You see, Senator Church has almost always opposed a
strong national defense. He led the fight to give away our Pan-
ama Canal and he voted to slash national defense procurement;
and now Senator Church is one of those who wants to push the
SALT II treaty through the Senate, which I believe would seri-
ously weaken America.'
John T. "Terry" Dolan, Chairman of the National Conservative Polit-
ical Action Committee, states, "a group like ours could lie through its
teeth and the candidate it helps stays clean."2 Should television and
radio stations be required, or even permitted, to broadcast political ad-
vertisements which distort the truth? Only a few years ago the likeli-
hood of a broadcaster being requested to air an attack on a candidate
for federal elective office containing fabrications and misleading innu-
endos was highly unlikely.
The 1976 Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo3 signifi-
* Partner, Epstein, Becker, Borsody & Green, Wash. D.C.; B.S., 1962, L.L.B., 1966,
University of Iowa. Former General Counsel, Federal Election Commission.
** Associate General Counsel, Electronic Data Systems Corp., Bethesda, Md.; B.A.,
1977, University of Wisconsin, J.D. 1980, Boston University.
1. National Conservative Political Action Comm. television advertisement broadcast
in Idaho during the 1980 senatorial campaign.
2. McPherson, The New Right Brigade: John Terry Dolan's NCP4C Targets Liberals
and the Federal Election Commission, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1980, at F1, col. 1.
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 323; Comment,
[649]
650 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:649
cantly changed the complexion of campaigns for federal elective office.
In Buckley, the Court struck down the limitations on independent ex-
penditures4 contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
of 1971, as amended in 1974,1 as an impermissible burden on the free-
doms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.6 Since the ruling in Buckley, the activ-
ity of independent political committees7 and, to a lesser extent, individ-
uals, has grown in geometric proportion. Millions of dollars are
collected by independent political committees and spent in an effort to
not only elect particular candidates, but also to attack the voting rec-
ord, character, and reputation of opposing candidates in an effort to
defeat them. As a result, the broadcast media are confronted with a
Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform. 76 COLUM. L. REv.
852 (1976).
4. When Buckley came before the Supreme Court, an "independent expenditure" was
implicitly defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 as follows: "No
person may make any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate during a
calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the
year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000." 18 U.S.C. § 608
(e) (1) (Supp. IV 1974). The act has subsequently been amended to expressly define "in-
dependent expenditure." 2 U.S.C. § 431 (17) (1982). See infra note 17.
5. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
7. A political committee is defined in terms of contributions received and expenditures
made on an annual basis. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (4) (1982). Among the different types of political
committees are "principal campaign committees" and "political action committees" also
known as "PACs." A principal campaign committee is a political committee designated and
authorized by a candidate to be his or her primary committee. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 (5), 432
(e) (1) (1982).
The term political action committee does not appear in the FECA. In fact, what is
commonly referred to as a PAC may be one of two types of political committees recognized
under the law. One type of PAC includes those established by corporations, trade associa-
tions, incorporated membership associations, cooperatives, and labor organizations. These
are referred to as "separate segregated funds" under 2 U.S.C. § 441b (b) (2) (1982), to indi-
cate that such PACs are sponsored by, or have a close relationship to. another organization,
and must observe rules governing their relationship with their affiliated or sponsored organi-
zation.
PACs established by groups of individuals, unincorporated associations, or partnerships
are often referred to in Federal Election Commission literature as "no connected organiza-
tion" political committees. In reality, of course, there may be a sponsoring organization.
But the law views such a political committee as a separate entity from the sponsoring organi-
zation. The structure of these PACs is legally the same whether they are formed by a small
group of concerned citizens or a large unincorporated organization such as the California
Medical Association. Probably the best known of the "no connected organization" PACs is
the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC). The focus of this article is
on one form of activity of "no connected organizations": independent expenditures. Indi-
viduals also make independent expenditures. This article refers to PACs and individuals
spending money in this manner as "independent expenders."
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complex new issue: Must television and radio stations sell air time to
independent expenders for the broadcast of political advertisements?
While independent expenders have a constitutionally protected
right to participate in the political process and speak out on the issues
and candidates,8 it is the contention of this article that there is no basis
for concluding that independent political committees and individuals
may purchase broadcast advertising time wherever and whenever they
desire. To the contrary, broadcast stations may develop and implement
general policies for processing, responding to, and rejecting editorial
advertisements proffered by independent expenders.
This article will briefly examine the underlying concepts which
make up the body of law regulating access to the broadcast media by
independent expenders. Most significant is the interplay of the First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association, the fairness
doctrine,9 the equal opportunities' ° and reasonable access" require-
ments embodied in the Communications Act and applied by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), and the Federal Election
Commission's (FEC) interpretation and enforcement of the law and
regulations respecting independent expenditures designed to affect
political campaigns. 2 This examination is followed by an analysis of
recent court decisions having a significant impact on political speech
and a review of the growth in independent political expenditures since
Buckley. Finally, the article discusses television and radio stations' ob-
ligations when confronted with a request from an independent ex-
pender to sell time for the broadcast of advertisements.
I. General Theory: The Convergence of Three Legal Concepts
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended,
together with the equal opportunity, reasonable access, and fairness
doctrines, operates in an area of fundamental First Amendment activi-
ties: discussion of the qualifications of candidates for public office and
the right of association in order to advance political beliefs and ideas.13
Because the First Amendment confers such a high degree of protection
against encroachment on the rights of speech and association, congres-
sional enactments regulating federal campaign activity of independent
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976).
9. See infra notes 27-29, and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 18-21, and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 22-26, and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 13-17, and accompanying text.
13. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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political committees, although broad, may not unduly burden those
rights.
A primary objective of the FECA is to prevent corruption and the
appearance of corruption in political campaigns for federal office.
14
The FECA restricts contributions by an individual to a candidate and
his authorized political committee to $1,000 per election, and to a max-
imum of $5,000 per calendar year to any independent political commit-
tee. 5 Although an independent political committee is prohibited from
contributing more than $5,000 per election to a candidate for federal
office and his authorized political committee, 6 there is no concomitant
restriction on the amount which may be expended by a truly independ-
ent political committee on behalf of a particular candidate. 17
While the FEC focuses on the broader issues of contributions to,
and expenditures by, independent political committees, the FCC is
concerned with the efforts of independent expenders to influence the
electorate by purchasing advertising time from the broadcast media. In
its dealings with individual expenders, the FCC is guided by three prin-
ciples of communications law: the equal opportunities doctrine, the re-
quirements affording candidates and their opponents reasonable access
to the airwaves, and the fairness doctrine.
The equal opportunities doctrine, embodied in section 315 (a) of
14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 26. Other objectives of the FECA include making
candidates and other expenders of money accountable to the public, equalizing the relative
abilities of rich and poor individuals to participate in the electoral process, and limiting the
amount of money spent in campaigns for federal elective office. It is beyond the scope of
this article to address the relative merits of these objectives and whether they are in fact met
by the statute.
15. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a (a) (1) (A), (C) (1982).
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (a) (2) (A) (1982). The term "election" is defined as follows:
"(A) a general, special, primary, or runoff election;
(B) a convention or caucus of a political party which has authority to nominate a
candidate;
(C) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating
convention of a political party; and
(D) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of
individuals for election to the office of President."
2 U.S.C. § 431 (1) (1982). For practical purposes, then, a candidate running for Congress
who must win a primary and general election would be able to receive $2,000 from an indi-
vidual and $10,000 from an independent political committee.
17. The term "independent expenditure" is defined to mean: "an expenditure by a per-
son expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is
made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee
or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate." 2
U.S.C. § 431 (17) (1982). See also 11 C.F.R. § 109.1 (a) (1982).
Spring 1983] SYMPOSIUM-CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 653
the Communications Act, 18 prevents favoritism by broadcasters toward
particular candidates by requiring that candidates for the same office
be given an equal opportunity to use the facilities of a broadcast sta-
tion. Sometimes referred to as the "equal time" requirement, section
315 is more comprehensive than implied by that label. Under this doc-
trine, broadcasters are required to provide to legally qualified candi-
dates for federal office 19 the right to obtain time in a period likely to
attract the same size audience as attracted by the previous use2" of the
broadcaster's facilities by an opposing candidate. The request for ac-
cess to the broadcast facilities must be made within seven days of the
initial broadcast and the station is obligated to sell the time during
specified periods immediately prior to an election and at the lowest unit
charge for the category of time being sold.2'
18. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (1976) provides as follows:
"If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, that such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
of this section. No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow
the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on
any -
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental
to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsec-
tion. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-
nection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-
the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to
operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance."
19. A "legally qualified federal candidate" is a person who has publicly announced that
he is a candidate for elective office, meets the qualifications prescribed by the applicable law
to hold the office for which he is a candidate, and who has qualified for a place on the ballot
or has publicly committed himself to seek election via the write-in method. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1940 (a) (1982). See also 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2) (1982).
20. As a general rule, any broadcast of the voice or picture of a candidate constitutes a
"use" of the television or radio station if the candidate can be identified by the audience.
Under § 315 of the Communications Act, there are four categories of broadcasts which do
not constitute a use. See supra note 18; see also The Law ofPoliticalBroadcasting and Cable-
casting (Political Primer), 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2286-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as New
Primer].
21. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (b) (1976). A broadcast station may charge a candidate only what it
would charge a commercial advertiser, and in some circumstances is obligated to charge a
candidate based on its volume discount rates even though a commercial advertiser is not
entitled to similar treatment. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (b) (1982). See New Primer, supra note 20,
at 2286-90.
654 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:649
A second aspect of the law of political broadcasting impacting on
First Amendment rights is the reasonable access provision of the Com-
munications Act.22 This provision permits the FCC to "'revoke any sta-
tion license . . . for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable
access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the
use of a broadcast station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal
elective office on behalf of his candidacy."2 3 The effect of the reason-
able access provision is to negate any incentive broadcasters may have
to refuse to sell air time to candidates for federal elective office created
by the requirement that the time be sold at the lowest unit charge for
comparable use.24
The term "reasonable access" is subject to no hard and fast defini-
tion. What may be reasonable for a station located in a major metro-
politan area such as New York City whose broadcast signal reaches
three or more states may not be reasonable for a station located in a
sparsely populated midwest farming community. Since the latter sta-
tion will likely have fewer candidates to accommodate, it would be rea-
sonable for that station to provide more time to each federal candidate
than that allowed to candidates by a New York station. 5 The FCC
will examine broadcast decisions to determine whether they are reason-
able in light of all the surrounding circumstances.26
Unlike the equal opportunities and reasonable access require-
ments embodied in the Communications Act, the fairness doctrine does
not apply to individual candidates for federal elective office. Rather,
the fairness doctrine imposes an obligation on broadcasters to ade-
quately cover issues of public importance for that geographic location
and requires that the station fairly reflect the differing viewpoints on
that issue.27 While television and radio stations must exercise their edi-
torial judgment and journalistic discretion in determining who will
gain access to the airwaves, the station need not provide an equal
22. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a) (7) (1976).
23. Id as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103 (a) (2) (A), 86 Stat. 3, 4 (1982). While
federal law does not require television and radio stations to grant reasonable access to candi-
dates for state and local office, the broadcast media have an obligation under the fairness
doctrine to devote air time to political campaigns for such offices in proportion to their
significance to the community so as to reflect the differing viewpoints being expressed. See
infra notes 27-28; New Primer, supra note 20, at 2286-90.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (b) (1976).
25. See New Primer, supra note 20, at 2286-90.
26. Id at 2287 (quoting Public Notice, Use of Broadcasting and Cablecast Facilities by
Candidatesfor Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 536 (1972)).
27. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969). The fairness
doctrine was incorporated in § 315 (a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a), by
the Act of Sept. 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 357 (1959).
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amount of time for broadcast of opposing views or provide time for
expression of those contrary views in the same program. 28 However,
the licensee must make a good faith determination of the appropriate
format and the amount of time to be devoted to the issue.29
II. Recent History of Political Speech
A. The 1974 Amendments and Buckley v. Valeo
Following the 1972 elections, Congress undertook a re-evaluation
of the federal campaign financing system and enacted the 1974 amend-
ments to the FECA.3° The key provisions of the 1974 amendments
limited to $1,000 the amount an individual could contribute,3 and to
$5,000 the amount a political committee could contribute32 to any can-
didate per election with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 on an
individual contributor;-3 placed limits on expenditures by individuals
or groups relative to clearly identified candidates; 34 restricted the
amount candidates for various federal offices could spend of their own
funds on their campaigns;35 and imposed overall expenditure limita-
tions on candidates seeking federal office.3 6
Shortly after enactment of the 1974 amendments, litigation was
initiated challenging the constitutionality of their provisions. On Janu-
ary 30, 1976, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Buckley v.
ValeoS the seminal decision establishing limits on congressional au-
thority in the area of campaign financing. In Buckley, the Court ruled
28. There are instances where a broadcaster is required to provide free air time for op-
posing viewpoints. In Culman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963), the FCC held that
under the fairness doctrine a broadcast licensee that has aired one side of an issue under
paid sponsorship is obligated to air the opposing views of an appropriate spokesperson free
of charge if the broadcaster is unable to obtain paid sponsorship for presentation of the
contrasting views.
29. See In re Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
30. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
31. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (a) (1) (A) (1982) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b) (1) (Supp. IV
1974)).
32. Id at § 441a (a) (I) (C) (1982) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b) (2) (Supp. IV 1974)).
33. Id at § 441a (a) (3) (1982) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b) (3) (Supp. IV 1974)).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (e) (1) (repealed 1976).
35. Id at § 608 (a) (1) (repealed 1976).
36. Id at § 608 (c) (repealed 1976).
Other provisions of the 1974 amendments imposed detailed reporting requirements on
political committees, 2 U.S.C. § 434 (a) (1982); established the eight member FEC of which
two members were to be appointed by the Presidentpro tempore of the Senate, two by the
Speaker of the House, and two by the President, 2 U.S.C. § 437 (c) (1976); and established
public financing of presidential nominating conventions, primary campaigns, and general
elections, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (1976).
37. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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that the contribution limitations enacted as part of the 1974 amend-
ments were not an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment
rights of speech and association.38 The limitations imposed on in-
dependent expenditures, however, and the cap on candidate spending
from personal funds on their own behalf could not be reconciled with
the First Amendment and were struck down.39
1. Permissible Restrictions on First Amendment Rights-The
Contribution Limitations
Freedom of political expression is a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution. As the Court stated in Buckley:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of govern-
ment established by our Constitution. The First Amendment af-
fords the broadest protection to such political expression in order
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."4
Furthermore, discussion of political campaigns and expression of polit-
ical ideas in a campaign setting is associational activity protected by the
First Amendment.4'
These rights are not without limit. The authority of Congress
under the Constitution to regulate federal elections is well-estab-
lished.4 2 In order to survive judicial review, however, federal election
laws which regulate political expression through restriction of contribu-
tions and expenditures 43 must serve a compelling governmental interest
38. Id at 23-39.
39. Id at 39-59. Discussion of the Court's analysis of the limits imposed on candidates'
use of their own funds insofar as it differs from the rationale for striking down the limits on
independent expenditures is beyond the scope of this article. Similarly, the Court's reason-
ing for sustaining the expenditure limitations imposed on presidential candidates who accept
public financing will not be analyzed.
40. Id at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
41. The First Amendment guarantees "'freedom to associate with others for the com-
mon advancement of political beliefs and ideas."' This freedom encompasses "'[tlhe right
to associate with the political party of one's choice."' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 15
(quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975)).
42. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 13.
43. The Supreme Court in Buckley rejected the contention that the contribution and
expenditure limitations should be viewed as regulating conduct, as in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), rather than speech. As the Court noted, even assuming that
the communicative aspect of the draft card burning in O'Brien implicated First Amendment
freedoms, the governmental interest in regulating the non-speech aspect of the conduct re-
sulted in an incidental restriction of First Amendment rights and was not directed at the
communicative aspect of the conduct. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16. Unlike the situation
presented by O'Brien, the congressional objective of limiting contributions and expenditures
in political campaigns "arises in some measure because the communication allegedly inte-
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which can satisfy the "strict scrutiny" standard." Of the three govern-
mental interests advanced in Buckley as justification for the limitations
on large contributions to political campaigns, only the governmental
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption re-
sulting from the potential influence of the contributions on elected can-
didates4 5 was held to be constitutionally sufficient.
4 6
The primary issue raised by the contribution limitations was the
restriction on an aspect of First Amendment associational rights: mak-
ing a contribution to a political party is one of the ways in which an
individual affiliates with a particular candidate or ideology.47 The
Court pointed out that contribution limitations do not impede an indi-
vidual's right to join a political party or work on behalf of a candi-
date.48  The majority also stated that the contribution limitations
neither affect the political dialogue of candidates49 nor restrict the
otherwise wide open and robust discussion by individuals of the candi-
dates and issues.50 The act of contributing serves as a communication
of support for a candidate or particular issue.51 Restricting the size of
the contribution may inhibit the intensity of one avenue an individual
may take to express his support, but it neither restrains the political
communication that arises out of the contribution nor prohibits other
means of communicating support for a candidate or ideology.52 With
nearly perfect foresight,53 the Court concluded that the contribution
limitations would not adversely affect candidates, but would merely
gral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." Id (quoting United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 382).
44. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25.
45. Id at 26. The other governmental interests advanced for the restrictions on contri-
butions were (1) muting the voices of the affluent to equalize the relative ability of all per-
sons to affect the outcome of elections and (2) slowing down the rising cost of political
campaigns so as to open the system to candidates without access to substantial amounts of
money. Id at 25-26. These justifications were rejected by the Court as insufficient bases for
impeding First Amendment rights through the contributions. Id at 48-49.
46. Id at 26.
47. Id at 22, 24.
48. Id at 22.
49. Id at 21. "The overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to require
candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to
compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to
expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of
money potentially available to promote political expression." Id at 21-22.
50. Id at 29.
51. Id at 21.
52. Id
53. See infra notes 96-122 and accompanying text.
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foster the proliferation of independent expenders. 4
2. Impermissible Restriction of First Amendment Rights-The
Expenditure Limitations
The Supreme Court found that both the expenditure and contribu-
tion limitations have an impact on First Amendment interests.5 5 In
sharp contrast to its view of the contribution limitations, the Court con-
cluded that the expenditure limitations constituted "substantial rather
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of polit-
ical speech."56
The most significant of these restrictions on independent expendi-
tures provided as follows:
No person may make any expenditure (other than an expenditure
made by or on behalf of a candidate within the meaning of sub-
section (c) (2) (B)) relative to a clearly identified candidate during
a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures
made by such person during the year advocating the election or
defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.57
The Supreme Court avoided invalidating the provision on vagueness
grounds by restricting its application to "expenditures for communica-
tions that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office." 58 Nevertheless, the Court
found this expenditure limitation to be an impermissible burden on
First Amendment freedoms.5 9 Unlike the burden on the rights of free
speech and association resulting from the contribution limitations, the
governmental interest6" was held to be inadequate to justify the ceiling
on independent expenditures.6 The primary rationale articulated by
the Court for overturning the expenditure limitations was that the in-
ability to coordinate the expenditures with the candidate undermines
their value and diminishes the likelihood of corruption.62 The Court
reasoned that uncoordinated expenditures (i.e., independent expendi-
tures) may be counterproductive, 63 an observation borne out by the
54. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 28.
55. Id at 19.
56. Id
57. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101 (a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265, 18 U.S.C. § 608 (e) (1) (1974)
(repealed 1976).
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 44. See also supra note 17.
59. 424 U.S. at 47-48, 51.
60. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for the governmental interests advanced
as justification for the restrictions on contributions.
61. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 45.
62. Id at 46-47.
63. Id at 47.
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1982 Congressional elections.'
The Court in Buckley rejected as constitutionally impermissible
the proffered Congressional objective of protecting the contribution
limitations by imposing restraints on expenditures in an effort to close
the so-called "independent expenditure loophole."65 The Supreme
Court also refused to accept as sufficiently compelling the governmen-
tal interests in muting the voices of the affluent in order to equalize the
ability of all individuals and organizations to affect the outcome of
elections, and in slowing down the ever increasing cost of political
campaigns.66
Addressing the limitation on expenditures by candidates from per-
sonal or family resources, 67 the Court refused to recognize that the
governmental interest in preventing corruption is advanced because the
use of personal funds may decrease candidate reliance on outside con-
tributions.68 More significantly, the Court felt that the expenditure lim-
itation restricted a candidate's freedom to speak out and vigorously
advocate his own election.69 The Court therefore held that these re-
strictions violated the First Amendment.10
The limitations on overall campaign expenditures also could not
be sustained on the basis of the proffered governmental interests in
preventing corruption or equalizing candidate resources. The Court
concluded that the contribution limitations adequately deal with the
corruption concern,71 and that as a result of those limitations, the
amount of money received by candidates should and "will normally
vary with the size and intensity of the candidate's support. ' 72 The gov-
ernmental interest in retarding the skyrocketing cost of political cam-
paigns was viewed by the Court as the primary objective for imposing
overall expenditure ceilings; however, this objective also was rejected
as a basis for infringing upon First Amendment rights. 71 The determi-
64. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 45.
66. Id. at 25-26.
67. As enacted in 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 608 (a) (1) (Supp. IV 1974), set limits on expendi-
tures from personal or immediate family funds in connection with a campaign at $50,000 for
presidential and vice presidential candidates, $35,000 for senatorial candidates and $25,000
for candidates for the House of Representatives. Candidates for the House of Representa-
tives from states only entitled to one representative were subject to the $35,000 ceiling on
expenditures.
68. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 53.
69. Id at 52.
70. Id at 54.
71. Id at 55-56.
72. Id at 56.
73. Id at 57.
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nation of how much will be spent in political campaigns is beyond the
scope of governmental authority and is left to the control of the
public.74
B. Republican National Committee v. FEC and Public Funding of
Presidential Campaigns
After Buckley, the question remained whether the expenditure and
contribution limitations of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act ("Fund Act")75 violated the First Amendment. The Fund Act con-
ditions eligibility for public campaign financing upon compliance with
expenditure limitations and agreement to forgo private contributions.76
In Republican National Committee v. FEC,77 a three-judge panel78 held
that the Fund Act limitations do not violate the First Amendment
rights of presidential candidates or their supporters.79
In dismissing the challenge to the Fund Act by the Republican
National Committee, the court found that a presidential candidate is
not obligated to accept public funding and the restrictions on spending
attendent thereto in lieu of unlimited private financing and spending.80
A presidential candidate's decision to accept financing under the Fund
Act is a voluntary choice which will be based on the candidate's evalu-
ation of his campaign priorities. The court reasoned that because can-
didates may choose between private and public funding, Congress has
74. Id
75. Chapter 95 of Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, I.R.C. §§ 9001-13
(1976).
76. I.R.C. § 9003 (b) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
"(b) Major parties. In order to be eligible to receive any payments under section 9006,
the candidates of a major party in a presidential election shall certify to the Commission,
under penalty of perjury, that -
(1) such candidates and their authorized committees wil not incur qualified cam-
paign expenses in excess of the aggregate payments to which they will be entitled under
section 9004, and
(2) no contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses have been or wil be
accepted by such candidates or any of their authorized committees except to the extent nec-
essary to make up any deficiency in payments received out of the fund on account of the
application of section 9006 (d), and no contributions to defray expenses which would be
qualified campaign expenses but for subparagraph (C) of section 9002 (11) have been or wil
be accepted by such candidates or any of their authorized committees.
"Such certification shall be made within such time prior to the day of the presidential
election as the Commission shall prescribe by rules or regulations."
77. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), a~fdmem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
78. Section 801 (b) of the Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9011 (b) (2), expressly grants jurisdic-
tion to a three-judge federal district court to "implement or contrue [sic]" any provision of
the Fund Act.
79. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. at 283, 286-87.
80. Id at 283, 285-86.
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authority under the General Welfare Clause -to restrict expenditures of
presidential candidates electing public financing, 81 and that the condi-
tions imposed for receipt of public financing do not abridge the First
Amendment rights of presidential candidates.8 2
The court also concluded that because the rights of a candidate
and his supporters are separate and distinct, the candidate's agreement
to forgo private contributions and unlimited expenditures does not
abridge the supporters' First Amendment rights of speech and associa-
tion. The court pointed out that a candidate's backers are left with
numerous alternative means of expressing their support, including con-
tributing their services and making expenditures uncoordinated with
the official campaign. 83 It is the candidate who determines whether to
accept or reject contributions from the general public; the complaint of
contributors should be directed to the candidate, not the courts.84
C. Common Cause v. Schmitt
In an attempt to stem the tide of ever increasing expenditures by
independent committees, suits were filed in mid-1980 by Common
Cause and the FEC. 5 The actions were filed against several independ-
ent expenders under section 9012 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code, a
little recognized provision not challenged in Buckley, which prohibits
independent committees from spending more than $1,000 on behalf of
a presidential candidate who had accepted federal funds for his cam-
paign.86 A three-judge panel ruled that the provision was an unconsti-
tutional limitation on expenditures for political speech and
association.8 7 The court noted that the form of campaign activity en-
81. Id at 284.
82. Id at 285. The court stated that: "While Congress may not condition benefit on the
sacrifice of protected rights. . . the fact that a statute requires an individual to choose be-
tween two methods of exercising the same constitutional right does not render the law inva-
lid, provided the statute does not diminish the protected right or, where there is such a
diminution, the burden is justified by a compelling state interest." .d at 284-85 (citations
omitted).
83. Id at 286.
84. Id
85. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C.), affrdper cur/am by an
equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
86. 26 U.S.C. § 9012 (f) (1) (1976) provides in relevant part that: "[I]t shall be unlawful
for any political committee which is not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible
candidates of a political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election
knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates,
which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee
of such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000."
87. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. at 493-94.
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gaged in by the defendants was speech on the highest constitutional
plane and subject to the highest level of protection."s The court ruled
that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption is insufficient to permit the limitation of expendi-
tures.8 9 The court thus held section 9012(f)(1) to be an unconstitutional
restraint of political speech.90
In reaching its decision, the court relied on that portion of the de-
cision in Republican National Committee v. FEC91 which held that the
Fund Act does not infringe the First Amendment rights of candidates'
supporters. The court in Common Cause read Republican National
Committee to mean that the restrictions associated with public funding
of presidential campaigns are permissible only because the right of can-
didates' supporters to independently participate in the campaign pro-
cess is not impeded. The court found especially significant that
"'uncoordinated expenditures are permitted without limit. Limitations
on uncoordinated expenditures were held unconstitutional in Buckley v.
Valeo' "92 The court concluded that expenditure limitations are no
more acceptable merely because they are incorporated in the Internal
Revenue Code rather than the federal election laws.93 The right to
make independent expenditures is the constitutional backbone of the
election laws because individuals speak through the money they con-
tribute to independent committees.94 The court therefore held that in-
dependent committees are entitled to the same First Amendment rights
as those afforded individuals to make independent expenditures in an
effort to influence the outcome of political campaigns. 95
III. Independent Expenditures: A post-Buekley Experiment
The growth of independent campaign activity since the ruling in
Buckley v. Valeo has been staggering. In 1976 there were 608 non-
party political committees, 96 more commonly known as political action
88. Id at 493.
89. Id (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 44-45).
90. Id at 496-97.
91. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), a fl'dmem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
92. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. at 495-96 (citing Republican Nat'1 Comm.
v. FCC, 487 F. Supp. at 286).
93. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. at 496.
94. Id
95. Id at 499-500.
96. 7 FEC Record 2 (1981).
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committees, or "PACs". By the end of the 1977-78 election cycle,9 7 the
number of PACs which had registered with the FEC ballooned to
1,949.98 This number increased further to 2,785 PACs during the 1979-
80 cycle99 and stood at 3,371 as of December 31, 1982.1°°
The amount of money spent as independent expenditures has like-
wise increased. The FEC reports that during the 1975-76 election cy-
cle, $2,033,207 was spent independently for or against 144
candidates.101 During the 1977-78 election cycle this number fell to
$317,455.1°2 The decline in the dollar amount of independent expendi-
tures from the 1976 level is a function of the presidential election of
that year. Discounting the amount of independent expenditures attrib-
utable to the 1976 presidential election reveals that $386,667 was spent
for or against congressional candidates during the 1975-76 election cy-
cle. 10 3 While this amount slightly exceeds that spent during the 1977-
78 cycle, the number of candidates affected increased by nearly fifty
percent. 104
The presidential election cycle of 1979-80 showed a marked in-
crease in spending over the previous four years. The FEC reports that
$16,084,273 was independently expended for and against candidates
for federal office during that two year period.' 0 5 Of that amount,
$13,745,444 was spent in an attempt to influence the presidential race,
97. An election cycle runs from January 1 of the year preceeding the election through
December 31 of the year in which the election is held. Thus, the 1977-78 election cycle ran
from January 1, 1977 through December 31, 1978.
98. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final Report on 1977-78 FinancialActivity of
Non-Party and Party Political Committees, Press Release 1 (Apr. 24, 1980).
99. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final PAC Report for 1979-80 Election Cycle,
Press Release 1 (Feb. 21, 1982). The number of PACs had decreased to 2,551 by the end of
1980 because some committees had completed their activity. Id
100. Fed. Election Comm'n, P,4C's Increase in Number, Press Release (Jan. 14, 1983).
101. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final Information on Independent Expendi-
tures, Press Release 1 (Oct. 9, 1980). The FEC reported its figures as "approximated and
unverified." A Congressional Quarterly review of FEC records concluded that $792,953 had
been spent as independent expenditures during the 1975-76 election cycle. Light, Surge in
Independent Campaign Spending, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1635 (1980). One commenta-
tor has concluded that the Congressional Quarterly data is more reliable than the FEC ap-
proximation because it was based on stricter application of independent expenditure criteria.
See Cantor, The Evolution and Issues Surrounding Independent Expenditures in Election
Campaigns, 82-87 GOV CONG. RESEARCH SERv. REP. 24 (1982).
102. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final Information on Independent Expendi-
tures, supra note 101, at 1.
103. Id
104. One hundred forty four candidates were affected by independent expenditures dur-
ing the 1975-76 election cycle and 215 candidates were affected during the 1977-78 cycle. Id
105. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top $16 Mil-
lion, Press Release 1, 4 (Nov. 29, 1981).
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with the remaining $2,338,829 expended on the congressional cam-
paigns. ' °6 The number of candidates affected by independent expendi-
tures nearly doubled to 425 from 215 affected during the previous
cycle. 107
The increase in independent expenditures directed at congres-
sional campaigns evidenced during the 1979-80 election continued into
the 1981-82 cycle. As of December 18, 1982, $4,534,382 in independent
expenditures had been reported to the FEC.1°8 This represents a nearly
one hundred percent increase over the prior election cycle - and the
figures are not yet final.
The 1978 election year marked the first time that independent ex-
penditures directed in opposition to particular candidates gained na-
tional recognition. The zenith of negative independent campaigning
occurred during the 1980 campaign when the National Conservative
Political Action Committee ("NCPAC") launched Target '80, a cam-
paign of negative advertisements directed primarily at six Democratic
senators. 10 9 The attention focused by the press on this negative cam-
paign and that of other groups was not in proportion with the actual
dollar expenditures of the groups. While the $2,191,084 funneled into
negative campaign activity during the 1979-80 election cycle' 0 far out-
strips the $59,182 expended against candidates during the 1975-76 elec-
tion cycle, and $74,964 during the 1977-78 cycle,"' it also represents a
ten point decrease in the percentage of independent expenditures spent
in an effort to defeat a clearly identified candidate from the twenty-four
percent level reached during the 1977-78 cycle. According to FEC
records, of the nearly $2.2 million independently spent in negative
106. Id
107. Id at4.
108. Fed. Election Comm'n, 1981-1982 Independent Expenditure Index by Commit-
tee/Person Expending, Press Release (Dec. 18, 1982). The total reflected in the FEC report
of $4,628,011 has been reduced by $93,629 in expenditures attributable to the 1979-80 cam-
paigns of Presidents Reagan and Carter paid during the 1981-82 election cycle. The report
of each PAC and individual has not been examined to determine whether costs incurred for
congressional elections during the 1979-80 cycle were paid during the 1981-82 cycle. If the
costs were paid in the later cycle, the reported figure should be reduced accordingly.
109. Light, supra note 101, at 1635. The six Senators were Birch Bayh of Indiana, Frank
Church of Idaho, Alan Cranston of California, John Culver of Iowa, Thomas Eagleton of
Missouri, and George McGovern of South Dakota. Only Senators Cranston and Eagleton
were re-elected.
110. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top $16 Mil-
lion, supra note 105, at 4.
111. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Information on Independent Expenditures,
supra note 101, at 1.
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campaign activity against sixty-five candidates,' 1 2 more than one half
was expended in an effort to unseat the six Democratic senators
targeted by NCPAC,"3 and approximately ninety percent of that
amount came directly from NCPAC." 4
Although the press went to great lengths during the 1980 campaign
to focus attention on the negative expenditures of NCPAC and the ef-
fect of this type of campaign activity, it failed to bring clearly into focus
the fact that there was no real proliferation of negative campaign activ-
ity. FEC reports indicate that during the 1979-80 election cycle nearly
seventy percent of all independent campaign expenditures spent in an
effort to defeat clearly identified candidates came from one source,
NCPAC.115
The data for the 1981-82 election cycle reflects both a change of
course in independent expenditures and a continuation of patterns es-
tablished in prior years. One of the more significant changes is in the
amount of independent expenditures. Prior to the 1981-82 election, the
most that had been spent on congressional campaigns by independent
expenders was $2.3 million during the 1979-80 cycle. ' 6 The amount
reported as independent expenditures through mid-December, 1982 ex-
ceeded $4.5 million.117 This figure is more than twice the amount spent
during the 1979-80 election cycle and is a fourteen fold increase over
the amount independently expended in the 1978 congressional
elections.
Another significant change is in how the money was spent. Of the
$4.5 million in independent expenditures reported, $3.9 million, or
eighty-six percent, was used for negative campaign activity." 8 This is
in stark contrast to the 1979-80 election cycle wherein fourteen percent
of the independent expenditures was spent to defeat clearly identified
candidates' and fifty-nine percent was spent on negative activity in
112. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top $16 Mil-
lion, supra note 105, at 4.
113. Id at 3.
114. Fed. Election Comm'n, 1979-80 Independent Expenditure Index by Commit-
tees/Person Expending, Press Release (Dec. 18, 1980).
115. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Index of Independent Expenditures, 1979-80, Press Re-
lease (Nov. 9, 1981).
116. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top $16 Mil-
lion, supra note 105, at 30.
117. Fed. Election Comm'n, 1981-82 Independent Expenditure Index by Commit-
tees/Person Expending, supra note 108.
118. Id
119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
666 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:649
congressional campaigns.120 Consistent with the prior election cycle,
NCPAC has been responsible for nearly seventy percent of all in-
dependent expenditures reported through mid-December, 1982.121
What occurred during the 1982 election cycle is what the public
was led to believe occurred in 1980: the vast majority of independent
expenditures was directed against rather than for particular candidates.
It is too early to predict whether this trend will continue in future elec-
tions, as the leading negative expenders may be re-evaluating their tac-
tics in light of the 1982 election results. Shortly after the 1980 election,
NCPAC targeted numerous potential candidates for attack. Of the one
dozen candidates against whom NCPAC spent the most money, only
one was defeated.1
22
120. Fed. Election Comm'n, Independent Expenditures 4pproach S2 Million, Press Re-
lease 1 (June 23, 1982).
121. As of December 18, 1982, the top ten negative independent expenders were:
Name Amount
NCPAC $2,788,180
Citizens Organized to Replace Kennedy 322,154
Life Amendment PAC, Inc. 206,018
Fund For A Conservative Majority 159,258
PRO PAC 125,413
Independent Action, Inc. 100,420
Citizens for Common Sense in National Defense 91,920
Californians for Better Leadership 52,559
Mid-American Conservative PAC 37,753
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Voting Power PAC 10,561
See Fed. Election Comm'n, 1981-1982 Independent Expenditure Index by Committee/Person
Expending, supra note 108.
122. Only Senator Howard Cannon of Colorado was defeated. It should be noted that
certain legal proceedings relating to Senator Cannon were being conducted during the cam-
paign period. The twelvd individuals and the amount spent by NCPAC as of December 18,
1982, are as follows:
Name Amount
Paul S. Sarbanes $624,435




Lowell P. Weiker 189,328
Lloyd Bentsen 167,849
Howard L. Cannon 161,980
James R. Jones 124,415
Daniel Patrick Moynihan 73,775
Dan Rostenkowski 57,507
Dennis Deconcini 26,571
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IV. Broadcasters' Rights and Obligations
Independent committee expenditures cannot be constrained by
statutorily imposed dollar limitations. However, independent expend-
ers, despite their extensive financial resources, may not spend their
funds wherever and whenever they desire. Television and radio sta-
tions are under no obligation to accept for broadcast the advertisements
of independent expenders. Rather, broadcasters have broad discretion
to refuse non-candidate advertisements. The First Amendment and
relevant federal statutes neither give independent committees un-
checked access to the airwaves nor require broadcasters to accept the
political advertisements produced by independent expenders.
A. CBS v. Democratic National Committee - Independent Expenders
Have No Constitutional Right of Access to the Broadcast
Media
The claim that the First Amendment guarantees a right to
purchase advertising time from the broadcast media was emphatically
rejected by the Supreme Court in CBS v. Democratic National Commit-
tee.123 At issue in CBS was whether broadcasters may, as a general
policy, refuse to sell advertising time to organizations wishing to speak
out on issues of public concern.' 24 The court concluded that such a
policy is not an infringement of the speaker's First Amendment right to
engage in political activity.' 25
In CBS, the Democratic National Committee and the Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) brought complaints before
the FCC alleging that their attempts to purchase time to air their views
were being thwarted by general policies against editorial advertising. 126
While BEM's attempt to purchase advertising time had been rejected
by a Washington, D.C. radio station, the Democratic National Com-
mittee did not complain of a particular refusal to sell advertising time,
but rather sought a declaratory ruling from the FCC that broadcasters
may not implement general policies prohibiting the sale of advertising
time to "responsible entities" for comment on issues of public con-
cern. 127 The FCC ruled that broadcasters may follow a general policy
123. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
124. Id at 97. The Democratic National Committee also challenged this practice as a
violation of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 35, 151-609 (1934) (amended 1952,
1960).
125. 412 U.S. at 126-27.
126. Id at 98.
127. Id at 98. See Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242
(1970); Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
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of rejecting editorial advertisements.128 The Commission reasoned that
while the fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to fully and fairly
cover issues of public concern, the broadcast licensee is invested with
broad discretion to determine how those issues will be presented.' 2 9
The Commission concluded that First Amendment rights are protected
by this system of controlling access to the media. 130 The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed the FCC and held that a flat
ban on paid public announcements violates the First Amendment, at
least when other types of paid announcements are accepted.13 1 The
circuit court reasoned that this policy constitutes unconstitutional
discrimination.1 32
In reversing the court of appeals decision, the Supreme Court
noted that the airwaves are a limited resource of extreme value; access
cannot be granted to everyone who can afford air time and desires to
convey their message by radio or television.133 Because there is limited
access to airwaves, "First Amendment standards are applied differently
to broadcast media than to the individual who conveys his message by
distributing leaflets or placing his soapbox on a busy street corner."' 134
The Court stated that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
open the market place of ideas to the free flow of information:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. . . .It is the right of the pub-
lic to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right
may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the
FCC.135
The fairness doctrine is the vehicle which had been developed over the
years as the appropriate means of balancing the First Amendment in-
terests which compete in the broadcast area. Broadcast stations do not
determine what issues are of public concern and entitled to coverage
fairly reflecting the differing viewpoints; rather, they are merely the
gatekeepers, regulating and balancing the amount of time devoted to a
128. 412 U.S. at 99.
129. 450 F.2d at 648; Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242
(1970).
130. 412 U.S. at 99; 450 F.2d at 648.
131. 412 U.S. at 100; 450 F.2d at 646.
132. 412 U.S. at 100; 450 F.2d at 661.
133. 412 U.S. at 101.
134. Id (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)) (citations
omitted).
135. Id at 102 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 390) (citations
omitted).
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given side of any particular issue. 136
In reaching its holding in CBS, the Supreme Court summarily re-
jected the proposition that private parties seeking access to the airwaves
should be the arbiters of whether their material would be broadcast. 137
The Court also refused to sanction a system by which the federal gov-
ernment would determine which speakers gain access to the air-
waves.' 38 The majority reasoned that permitting a right of access
would cause the FCC to become even more involved in overseeing day-
to-day decisions of individual broadcasters on such issues as whether a
particular group has been accorded sufficient air time to present its
views.139 Governmental supervision of this nature would raise substan-
tial First Amendment problems. 140 The Court concluded that "[t]o sac-
rifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is not
warranted." ' 4'
B. Independent Expenders Have No Statutory Basis for Compelling
Broadcasters to Sell Them Time for Editorial
Advertisements
1. Broadcasters Are Not Common Carriers
It has long been recognized that radio and television broadcast sta-
tions are not common carriers 14 2 within the meaning of the Communi-
cations Act.' 4 3 Section 3 (h) of the Communications Act specifically
provides that a person engaged in radio broadcast shall not, insofar as
136. Id at 110-11. Admittedly, the system is not perfect. However, failure on the part of
broadcasters to flawlessly balance the presentation of competing viewpoints is not sufficient
grounds for diluting licensee responsibility. See id
137. Id at 124-25.
138. Id at 126-27.
139. Id at 127.
140. In a portion of the opinion dealing with governmental action which was not
adopted by a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that: "[lit would be anoma-
lous for us to hold, in the name of promoting the Constitutional guarantees of free expres-
sion, that the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of
restraints urged by respondents. To do so in the name of the First Amendment would be a
contradiction. Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to the rigid limitations
that the First Amendment imposes on Government. Application of such standards to
broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on
issues of public interest." Id at 120-21.
141. Id at 127.
142. The prerequisites for being deemed a communications common carrier are provi-
sion of services to customers on an indiscriminate basis and transmission of intelligence of
the users' own design and choosing. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1050-51
(8th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
143. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1934) (amended 1960).
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such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.144 The refer-
ence to radio broadcasting in section 3 (h) has been construed to in-
clude television broadcasting.1 4
5
As part of its decision in CBS v. Democratic National Committee,
the Court examined the legislative history of the Communications Act
and its forerunner, the Radio Act of 1927.146 On both occasions, Con-
gress had proposals before it which would have required broadcasters
to open their facilities to any person wishing to speak out on issues of
public concern. 47 In both instances, Congress rejected the invitation to
impose common carrier status on broadcasters. Instead, the legislature
enacted what became section 3 (h) of the Communications Act, specifi-
cally exempting broadcast stations from common carrier status. 148
Although the Court in CBS concluded that the Communications
Act does not mandate that broadcasters open their microphones to any-
one wishing to convey a message, it left open the question whether the
FCC may promulgate regulations requiring broadcasters to permit a
limited range of public access. 149 In 1976, the FCC issued regulations
imposing mandatory channel capacity and access requirements on
cable television systems with 3,500 or more subscribers.150 These cable
systems were required to develop a minimum twenty channel capacity
by 1986 and make certain of those channels available for public ac-
cess. 5' The FCC regulations divested cable television operators of any
control over who may gain access to their public access channels and
what may be broadcast on those channels."' The rules were chal-
lenged by Midwest Video Corporation as beyond the jurisdiction of the
144. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h) (1934). Section 3 (h) of the Communications Act provides that:
"'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trans-
mission of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this
chapter, but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so
engaged, be deemed a common carrier."
145. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1959) (citing
Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carrol, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950)).
146. 412 U.S. at 105-10.
147. Id. at 105, 107-08.
148. Id. at 108-09.
149. Id at 131. See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 704.
150. F.C.C. Report and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976), reconsidera-
tion denied, 62 F.C.C.2d 399 (1978).
151. The rules promulgated by the FCC also required the cable systems to possess the
technical capability for two-way, non-voice communication; to the extent of their available
activated channel capacity, provide four separate channels, one each for use by public, edu-
cational, local government, and leased-access users; and make equipment available for pub-
lie-access channel users. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 693-94.
152. Id at 693.
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FCC and as an unwarranted invasion of the free speech guarantee of
the First Amendment. 53 The Eighth Circuit agreed and held that the
access rules were not "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's jurisdic-
tion, 154 were an attempt to impose common carrier obligations on
broadcasters,155 and were an impermissible exercise of the Commis-
sion's authority.' 56
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that while the
FCC has authority to regulate cable broadcasters, there is no basis for
removing control from cable systems over the composition of their pro-
gramming. ' 57 The Court stated that the access rules imposed common
carrier obligations on the cable television systems, and held that these
obligations violate the unequivocal prohibition of section 3(h) of the
Communications Act.' 5
8
The Court did not completely lay the issue of broadcaster common
carrier obligations to rest. It left open the possibility that broadcast
stations might be subject to "less intrusive access regulation [which]
might fall within the Commission's jurisdiction."'159 While the FCC
apparently retains some authority to require broadcasters to permit ac-
cess to the airwaves, there is no longer any question that radio and
television stations are immune from common carrier obligations and
that they need not open their facilities to every independent expender
that desires to broadcast its message.' 60
2. A Grant of Reasonable Access to Candidates/or Federal Office Does
Not Entitle Independent Committees to Similar Treatment
In 1972, Congress amended the Communications Act to permit the
FCC to "revoke any station license. . . for willful or repeated failure
to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally quali-
fied candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."'' 61
Nine years later, the Supreme Court interpreted this provision and fur-
ther refined the right of the broadcast media to control public access to
153. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), a'd, 440 U.S. 689,
694-95 (1979).
154. 571 F.2d at 1040.
155. Id at 1052.
156. Id at 1051-52.
157. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 700.
158. Id at 702.
159. Id at 705 n.14.
160. See J. Curtis Herge (NCPAC), 88 F.C.C.2d 626, 627 (1981).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a) (7) (1972). This section was added by the Campaign Communi-
cation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, Title I, § 103 (a) (2) (A), 86 Stat. 4 (1972).
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their facilities.' 62 In CBS v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that section
312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act creates an enforceable right of
reasonable access to the airwaves for candidates seeking federal elec-
tive office. 163 The Court recognized that the section does more than
merely codify preexisting law under the public interest standard.'"
The Court then admonished broadcasters to consider each request on
its individual merits and to consider such factors as the amount of time
previously purchased by the candidate, the potential for response time
requests by a candidate's opponent, and the potential disruption to reg-
ularly scheduled programming when responding to a request from a
candidate. 165 It is inappropriate for a broadcaster to ignore these crite-
ria and adopt uniform policies for responding to candidate requests in
lieu of evaluating each request on its individual merits.'66
Significantly, the majority opinion notes that neither this decision
nor any previous Supreme Court decision has approved a "general
right of access to the media"' 67 - a right which could be used by in-
dependent committees as a means of forcing broadcast licensees to air
their political advertisements. The right of access recognized in CBS v.
FCC is a "reasonable" right of access and is enforceable only by "le-
gally qualified federal candidates."'' 68
As could be expected, in an effort to gain their own right of access,
independent committees attempted to turn the Court's decision in CBS
v. FCC to their advantage by using it as a basis for mounting a chal-
lenge to the general policies of broadcasters against airing political ad-
vertisements. The National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC) sent a letter to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC, on
September 22, 1981, requesting that the Commission "re-examine" its
162. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
163. Id at 377-79.
164. Id at 377-78. Prior to the enactment of§ 312 (a) (7), the public interest requirement
imposed an obligation on broadcast stations to devote some time to political issues, but no
candidate had a right of access to the airwaves unless his opponent used a station's facilities.
Political broadcasting was one of the 14 criteria reviewed to determine whether a broad-
caster meets its public interest obligations. Stations used their editorial judgment to deter-
mine the extent of coverage to be accorded a political race and whether free air time would
be provided. See id at 378-79 (citing Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America v. WDAY,
Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 534 (1959); Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312 (a) (7) of the
Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1087-88 (1978)).
165. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 387-88.
166. Id The Court stated that if broadcasters did not respond to the individual merits of
each candidate's request, the Commission would not be required to sustain the station's
denial of access. Id
167. Id at 396.
168. Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Spring 1983] SYMPOSIUM-CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 673
position that independent committees such as NCPAC do not have the
right to purchase radio and television time to air their editorial adver-
tisements. 6 9 The FCC's Broadcast Bureau 170 categorically rejected the
NCPAC request.17  The Bureau's ruling reaffirmed that broadcast sta-
tions are not common carriers obligated to afford all individuals and
groups a right of access, and concluded that independent political com-
mittees have no right to purchase advertising time.172 In reaching this
result, the Bureau relied on its prior analysis of section 312 (a) (7)173
and the Supreme Court's decision in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee. 174
Unwilling to accept this ruling, NCPAC filed a second complaint
with the Broadcast Bureau. 75 NCPAC raised the issues argued in the
September 22, 1981, letter, including the claim that "NCPAC enjoys an
affirmative right of reasonable access to the use of broadcast stations,"
and that radio and television licensees must "broadcast NCPAC spon-
sored political advertisements on a reasonable basis."' 176 In addition to
relying on RedLion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC17 7 and CBS v. Democratic
National Committee,17 NCPAC again asserted that CBS v. FCC sup-
ports its contention that the Commission has an affirmative obligation
to grant independent committees a reasonable right of access to the
broadcast media. 1
79
The Bureau noted that it could not "ascertain any distinction" be-
tween the complaint and the September request. 80 In dismissing
NCPAC's position, the Bureau concluded that nothing in the Court's
opinion in CBS v. FCC nor in the language or legislative history of
section 312 (a) (7) could form a basis to afford any group or individual
other than candidates for federal elective office a right of access to the
169. Letter from J. Curtis Herge to the Honorable Mark S. Fowler (Sept. 22, 1981).
170. The Broadcast Bureau is charged with ruling on complaints and requests to the
FCC. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.71 (g) (1982).
171. J. Curtis Herge (NCPAC), 88 F.C.C.2d 626 (1981). An appeal of this decision to the
full Commission was denied on May 6, 1982. J. Curtis Herge (NCPAC), 89 F.C.C.2d 626
(1982).
172. J. Curtis Herge (NCPAC), 88 F.C.C.2d 626, 627-28.
173. Id at 628 & n.2 (citing New Primer, supra note 20, at 2221-22, 2249-51); Robert H.
Hauslein, 39 F.C.C.2d 1064, 1065 (1973).
174. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See supra notes 123-141 and accompanying text.
175. NCPAC Complaint, F.C.C. No. C12-195 (filed Dec. 8, 1981).
176. Id at 14.
177. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
178. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
179. J. Curtis Herge, 88 F.C.C.2d 626, 626-28.
180. Id.
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broadcast media. 181
C. Additional Grounds for Refusing to Air Independent Committee
Advertisements
In light of CBS v. Democratic National Committee, CBS v. FCC,
and recent Broadcast Bureau determinations, it is apparent that in-
dependent expenders have neither a constitutional nor a statutory right
of access to the broadcast media. As long as the requirements of the
fairness doctrine are met, broadcasters should be allowed to develop
general policies for handling requests from independent committees to
run editorial advertisements. While it is physically impossible to ac-
cord access to everyone who has a message to convey, the fairness doc-
trine guarantees that the public interest will be served through the
broadcast of the differing viewpoints on issues of public concern.'82
Another basis on which broadcasters may rely to refuse to sell air
time to independent political committees for editorial advertising is the
potential of being hauled into court to defend against a defamation
action. The Supreme Court has held that broadcast stations which
carry advertisements for qualified federal candidates are immune from
liability for libelous remarks and representations made in those adver-
tisements. 83 The Court reached this conclusion because the stations
are statutorily prohibited from exercising their editorial judgment or
censoring in any way the material submitted for broadcasting.1 8 4
There is no obligation imposed on television and radio stations to air
independent committee editorial advertisements. Accordingly, there is
no precedent which grants broadcasters immunity from suit for defam-
atory statements made in independent committee advertisements which
they air.185
Broadcasters might also refuse to sell air time to an independent
committee on the ground that the station may become obligated to pro-
181. Id.
182. The FCC recognizes that the selection of public officeholders is an issue of public
concern subject to the constraints of the fairness doctrine. See id at 629; New Primer, supra
note 20, at 2301.
183. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531-35
(1958).
184. Id at 527-30. The pertinent statute is 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (1976). That section of
the Communications Act provides in relevant part that: "If any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting sta-
tion, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use
of such broadcasting station: Provided that such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section."
185. See J. Curtis Herge, 88 F.C.C.2d 626, 628-29.
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vide free response time to the opposing candidate or his supporters. A
radio or television station which broadcasts editorial advertisements of
a candidate or his supporters, including an independent committee,
during an election period will incur an obligation to sell comparable
time to the opposing candidate, his authorized spokesman, or an indi-
vidual, a group or an independent committee supporting the candi-
date.'86 While broadcasting an independent committee advertisement
in support of a particular candidate during an election period may not
require the station to makefree response time available to supporters of
an opposing candidate, 18 7 the same cannot be said when such adver-
tisements are run outside of election periods. Under Cullman Broad-
casting Co. ,'8 a television or radio station may not avoid its obligation
under the fairness doctrine to broadcast differing viewpoints from those
expressed in a sponsored program which for the first time addresses
particular issues of public concern when a paying sponsor cannot be
found to support a follow-up program. 8 9 Using Cullman as its refer-
ence point, the Broadcast Bureau has concluded that broadcast of an
independent committee editorial advertisement outside of an election
period could "obligate the station or network to afford free response
time" to the opposing candidate or his supporters. 190
The above discussion focuses on the criteria underlying general
policies for refusing to accept paid editorial advertisements of in-
dependent expenders. It should not be concluded that these are the
only grounds which may be used to reject such advertisements. There
is no reason why broadcast stations may not evaluate and refuse to run
non-candidate advertisements on a case-by-case basis. Criteria for
evaluating particular submissions, such as the libelous content of repre-
sentations made in an advertisement, may parallel the bases of general
policies for refusing to accept independent committee advertisements.
When deciding whether to air a particular advertisement, the broadcast
station should also be able to consider the tenor of the piece - whether
it is a positive advertisement in support of a candidate, a negative dis-
tortion of an elected official's voting record, or an attack on the candi-
date's character.
The decision to sell advertising time is to be left to the independent
editorial judgment of the broadcast licensee. In making this editorial
186. See, e.g., Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 708-09 (1970).
187. See J. Curtis Herge, 88 F.C.C.2d at 628-29 (citing Hon. Thomas F. Eagleton, 81
F.C.C.2d 423, 427 (1980)).
188. 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
189. Id at 577.
190. J. Curtis Herge, 88 F.C.C.2d at 629.
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decision, nothing precludes the television or radio station from consid-
ering the solicited and unsolicited opinions of third parties regarding
the proposed advertisement. In dismissing a challenge to this practice
in National Conservative Political Action Committee v. Kennedy,191 the
District Court for the District of Columbia found that NCPAC's con-
stitutional rights had not been violated by the consultations between
the broadcasters and candidates for office about whom NCPAC had
proffered critical advertisements. 192 Any attempt to prevent discourse
between a broadcaster and an individual would infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of the speaker and the broadcaster's right to hear
another's point of view. 193 This is no less true when the communica-




Independent expenditures, particularly those made to defeat can-
didates for federal office, have increased to a significant level. 195 The
$4.5 million spent as independent expenditures during the 1981-82
election cycle and reported to the FEC through December 18, 1982196 is
indicative of the fact that this form of political activity will continue to
grow and remain with us for the foreseeable future. Yet in comparison
with other forms of campaign financing engaged in by PACs, in-
dependent expenditures play a small role. During the 1979-80 election
cycle, there was slightly more than $16 million in independent expendi-
tures.' 97 This represents a mere twelve percent of the $133.2 million
spent by PACs during that period. 98
191. 563 F. Supp. 622, 625-26 (D.D.C. 1983), afdper curiam, 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The NCPAC complaint alleged that certain congressmen had persuaded the broad-
casters not to carry NCPAC political advertisements. The NCPAC argued that the refusal
by the broadcasters to air the proferred advertisement resulted in an infringement on
NCPAC's First Amendment right of freedom of speech and expression and Fifth Amend-
ment right of equal protection, as well as a conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3).
192. Id. at 624. Following consultations with the candidates, the broadcasters refused to
air the NCPAC advertisements. Id
193. Id at 625-26.
194. Id at 626.
195. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
196. Fed. Election Comm'n, 1981-1982 Independent Expenditure Index by Commit-
tee/Person Expending, supra note 108.
197. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top $16 Mil-
lion, supra note 105, at 1, 4.
198. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Issues Final Summary Data on PA C Giving, Press Re-
lease 1 (Aug. 4, 1981).
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For broadcast licensees faced with a request to run an independent
committee political advertisement, the issue is not whether there will be
a continued growth of independent expenditures and whether they im-
pede or further the objectives of the federal election laws. Rather, the
question is more concrete and immediate: Is the broadcaster obligated
to provide air time for the advertisement? Decisions from the courts
and federal regulatory agencies indicate that radio and television sta-
tions are under no obligation to provide independent expenders access
to the airwaves for broadcast of political advertisements. Neither the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and association embod-
ied in the First Amendment, nor the fairness doctrine, equal opportuni-
ties and reasonable access requirements of the Communications Act,
nor the federal election laws require that independent expenders be
granted a right of access to the airwaves comparable to that of candi-
dates for federal elective office. Instead, the interpretation and applica-
tion of these rules, reviewed in conjunction with First Amendment and
federal election law requirements, result in the conclusion that televi-
sion and radio stations may develop and implement general policies to
evaluate political advertisements offered by independent expenders and
are under no obligation to air such advertisements.

